The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil
Procedure: Federal Civil Rule 83 and District
Court Local Rulemaking Powers
David M. Roberts*
Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives district courts the authority to promulgate local practice rules "not
inconsistent" with the federal rules themselves.' The stated
objective of rule 83 is to preserve federal procedural consistency
without proscribing some flexibility. On the one hand, the
crafters of the rules saw superfluous rulemaking as contrary to
the simplicity and uniformity achieved by the 1938 federal rules.
On the other hand, they recognized that local rulemaking may
be the best means to achieve some important efficiencies, accommodate local practice conditions and needs, and promote procedural innovation and reform. Although the need for local rules
originally was viewed as quite limited,' the district courts have
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1. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 provides:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time
to time make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with
these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court
shall upon their promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Court of the
United States. In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may
regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1984) (all courts established by acts of Congress may prescribe rules for conduct of their business, so long as the rules are consistent with acts of
Congress and Supreme Court rules). Congress has provided for regulation by local rule in
specific instances. See statutes and rules cited infra note 60.
2. See, e.g., Abridged Report to the Judicial Conference of the Committee on Local
District Court Rules 969 n.1 (1940), reprinted in 4 Fed. R. Serv. 969 (Callaghan 1941)
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taken up their rulemaking power with an enthusiasm that would
astound the framers of rule 83. In the past four-and-one-half
decades, the district courts have promulgated nearly 3000 local
rules.3 The rules cover a wealth of areas, ranging from the trivial
to the profound. In some districts, they are now nearly as important as the federal rules themselves.
At its last annual meeting, the Judicial Conference of the
United States, acting on the recommendation of its Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, forwarded a proposed
amendment of federal rule 83 to the Supreme Court for adoption.' Noting criticism both of the local rulemaking process and
of the validity of many local rules,6 the committee proposed
[hereinafter cited as Knox Report]; A.B.A., FEDERAL RULES

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,

PRO-

CEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON AND OF THE SYMPOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY

232 (1938) (statement of W. Mitchell) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS]. See
also authorities collected and discussed in Note, Rule 83 and Local Federal Rules, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 1255-59 (1967).
3. The local federal rules are commercially published in Fed. Local Ct. R. (Callaghan), but there is no generally available definitive source. An attorney must contact the
court clerk for a copy of rules in force, and in some cases, the clerk of a particular judge.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts has prepared a 223-page Local
Rule Index, which is now maintained on computer by the Federal Judicial Center.
4. The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules submitted a final draft revision of rule 83
to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure on July 18, 1984. The Judicial
Conference transmitted proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to the Supreme Court with the recommendation that they be approved and submitted to
Congress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1984).
5. The proposed rule 83, with new material underscored and deleted material struck
through, provides:
RULE 83. RULES BY DISTRICT COURTS
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time
to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment,
make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules.
A local rule so adopted shall take effect upon the date specified by the district
court and shall remain in effect unless amended by the district court or abrogated by the judicial council of the circuit in which the district is located. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall upon their
promulgation be furnished to the Supreme Curt of thc United States judicial
council and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and be made
available to the public. In all cases not provided for by rule, the district eoews
judges and magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in which they act.
6. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 83 committee note, 98 F.R.D. 337, 370 (1983). See generally 12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3152, at 217 (1973); Note, supra note 2; Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts-A Survey,
1966 DUKE L.J. 1011. But see Flanders, Local Rules in FederalDistrict Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or Information?, 14 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 213 (1981) (most local rules are
well reasoned and beneficial; sum total of errors is insignificant).
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reform by requiring public notice and an opportunity for comment before district court judges adopt local rules. In addition,
the rules could be abrogated by the Circuit Judicial Council.7
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts, rather
than the Supreme Court, would become the repository of copies
of all local rules, which would be made available to the public.
Notice and comment rulemaking and circuit council review
are important ameliorative reforms, but further re-thinking is
necessary to preserve the benefits of local rulemaking without
the costs of undermining the integrity and uniformity of federal
civil procedure through a proliferation of local rules. The proposed changes do not address some of the most fundamental difficulties of rule 83. In particular, the proposed amendment does
not jettison the rule's sole guideline for testing the validity of a
local rule-that it must not be "inconsistent" with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. "Inconsistency" has not been a useful
standard against which to measure local rules.'
7. Circuit judicial councils are composed of the chief judge of the circuit, circuit
judges, and district court judges; they meet twice a year. 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1) (1984). A
council may hold hearings and "make all necessary and appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious administration of justice within its circuit." 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(1)
(1984). The Advisory Committee noted the expectation that councils "will examine all
local rules, including those currently in effect, with an eye toward determining whether
they are valid and consistent with the Federal Rules, promote inter-district uniformity
and efficiency, and do not undermine the basic objectives of the Federal Rules." Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D.
337, 373 (1983).
8. See supra note 1. One reason for rule 83's ineffectiveness has been the inability of
the Supreme Court to perceive its purposes. The Court has twice attempted to measure
the validity of local rules against the "inconsistency" standard articulated in rule 83.
Both efforts were inadequate.
In Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960), the Court examined a local rule allowing
discovery depositions in admiralty proceedings. The Northern District of Illinois had
promulgated the rule pursuant to General Admiralty Rule 44. Id. at 643. At that time,
admiralty was exempted from the federal rules and was governed by the General Admiralty Rules. Id. at 646. General Rule 44 permitted promulgation of local rules "provided
the same are not inconsistent with these [admiralty] rules." Id. at 647.
The Court struck down the local rule as inconsistent with the General Admiralty
Rules. Id. The Court characterized the change in practice caused by the local rule as
weighty and complex. Id. at 649. It also noted the interest in maintaining nationwide
uniformity in admiralty proceedings. Id. at 650. The Court concluded that enacting
"basic procedural innovations" requires the rulemaking powers of the Supreme Court.
Id. Only this process would ensure "mature consideration of informed opinion from all
relevant quarters, with all the opportunities for comprehensive and integrated treatment
which such consideration affords." Id.
Thirteen years later, the Court upheld a local rule of the District of Montana that
provided for six-person juries in civil cases. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 163 (1973).
The Court distinguished Miner by concluding that the rule was not a "basic procedural

540

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 8:537

This Article begins by demonstrating that the proliferation
of local rules indeed poses a threat to the integrity and uniformity of federal procedure. The Article next examines the general
policies relating to local rulemaking. Based on that analysis, the
final section presents specific proposals for rethinking rule 83 to
permit informed local control over truly local matters, while
placing beyond the reach of district courts those matters that
are national in scope.
Reviewing existing local rules in 1940, a committee of
judges-the Knox Committee-concluded that most local rules
were dispensable because they conflicted with the letter or the
spirit of the federal rules, unnecessarily repeated or restated federal rules, covered pre-empted ground, or provided rigid procedural detail in areas deliberately unregulated.9 A survey of local
rules today supports the same conclusions and criticisms. Rather
than uniformity, a high degree of local diversity has been introduced into almost every phase of federal pretrial procedure,
including laying of venue, pleading, the use of motions directed
to the pleadings, discovery, and even the substitution of alternative methods of dispute resolution for the litigation process
itself. Many local rules arguably are consistent with the explicit
language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but conflict
with their underlying purpose or fundamental policies. Other
local rules are unwise, confusing, or poorly drafted.
Rule 83 has not precluded district court adoption of local
rules that, on their face and by their inescapable plain meaning,
erect procedural standards contrary to the letter of the federal
rules. The Northern District of Texas, for example, prohibits
motions for a more definite statement "when the information
innovation." Id. at 163-64 n.23. That conclusion rested on the determination that the
reduction in jury members "plainly does not bear on the ultimate outcome of the litigation." Id.
In dissent, Justice Marshall opined that "surely it cannot be doubted that this shift
in practice of seven hundred years' standing . . . constitutes a 'basic procedural innovation.'" Id. at 168 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The "outcome-determinative" standard
presented in the majority opinion is neither a measure of how "basic" a procedural innovation is, nor of whether it is inconsistent with the federal rules.
Miner and Colgrove give little assistance in explicating the inconsistency standard of
rule 83. Beyond their facial agreement that basic procedural innovations are beyond the
scope of local rulemaking power, they provide no useful standards for distinguishing the
changes that are basic from those that are not. Further, they are irrelevant to the vast
majority of local rules whose innovations could hardly be said to be more basic than that
upheld in Colgrove.
9. See id. at 969-70.
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sought can be obtained by discovery.""0 Federal rule 12(e), however, has no such limitation; it permits the motion whenever "a
pleading . . . is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." The local
rule requires a would-be movant to plead responsively before
obtaining, through discovery, the very information necessary to
frame his pleading.
At the other extreme from the Northern District of Texas'
distaste for rule 12(e) motions is the apparent affection of its
neighboring district in New Mexico for motions under rule
12(b). A local rule in that district requires a party who files an
answer or other pleading that raises one of the seven defenses
specified in rule 12(b) to request in writing that it be treated as
a motion." Except for jurisdictional motions, any defenses
articulated in the pleadings, but not reduced to a motion, are to
be treated as waived.' 2 This "mandatory motion" and waiver
provision conveniently ignores the language of federal rule 12(b)
itself, which explicitly gives to the pleader an option whether to
raise the defenses by motion or by pleading.
Other clear inconsistencies between local rules and federal
rules and statutes are pervasive.'s Many districts, for example,
require that certain civil rights complaints
be verified,' 4
although federal rule 11 provides otherwise. 15 Some of these dis10. N.D. TEx. R. 5.2(d).
11. D.N.M. R. 5(c) provides:
If an answer or other pleading raises or contains any of the seven enumerated defenses provided in Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the party filing such a pleading shall request in writing that such portion of the
answer or other pleading be treated as a motion and, thereafter, it shall be
considered as a motion filed under Rule 9 of these rules. Should a party fail to
make such written request, such a defense may be treated as having been
waived, except for jurisdictional motions.
12. Id.
13. Another example comes from adjoining districts across the continent, which
have displayed greater agreement than Texas and New Mexico. FED. R. Ctv. P. 8(a)(3)
requires that every pleading that contains a claim for relief shall contain a demand for
the judgment to which the pleader deems himself entitled. In the District of New Jersey
and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, local rules prohibit persons with claims for
unliquidated damages from alleging the dollar amounts claimed. D.N.J. R. 8(g); E.D. PA.
R. 30. This regional reform of federal pleading standards not only contravenes rule
8(a)(3) but also renders it difficult for plaintiffs with unliquidated damages to obtain
judgment by default, despite provision for such judgments in rule 54(c), which provides:
"A judgment by default shall not... exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand
for judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
14. E.g., N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 47; W.D. Ky. R. 29(a).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides: "Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule
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tricts also provide that venue in prisoner condition-of-confinement cases may be laid only in the district in which the plaintiff
resides,1 6 while the federal venue statute affords a significantly
broader choice. 17 Summary judgment has proven to be a particularly fertile ground for local variations. By stipulating that the
failure of a party to file a brief in connection with a summary
judgment motion "shall be deemed an admission" that the opponent's position on the motion is well taken,1 8 at least one district
has effectively displaced the uniform standard adopted by Congress and the Supreme Court in rule 56.19 Other districts have
shown a similar penchant for unnecessary paperwork in their
requirement that all motions for summary judgment be accompanied by suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law."
Inoperative in these districts is federal rule 52(a), which states
that findings of fact and conclusions of law "are unnecessary on
decisions of motions under rules 12 or 56."
Distressing though such blatant inconsistencies are, other
inconsistencies pose greater difficulties because they are more
subtle and more difficult to expose. These arise when a local rule
conflicts, not with the express language of a federal rule, but
rather with the general policies or purposes underlying the federal rule-what the 1940 Knox Committee termed "conflict with
the spirit of the federal rules. ' 21 At least three classes of these
local rules can be identified.
One such class of local rules are those that mandate wholesale and unthinking application of ad hoc discretionary powers
granted by the federal rules to deviate from general procedural
norms. An instance of this process is found in districts that have
provided by local rule for the routine bifurcation of liability and
damages issues in, for example, personal injury cases.2 2 Although
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit."
16. E.g., S.D. ILL. R. 10; D. MD. R. 37A; E.D. OKLA. R. 5.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1984) (emphasis added) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, nondiversity civil actions may be brought in the judicial district in which
all defendants reside or in which the claim arose."

18. D.N.D. R. 5(c).
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
20. E.g., S.D. ALA. R. 8;C.D. CAL. R. 7.14.1.
21. See Knox Report, supra note 2, at 970-71.
22. E.g., N.D.N.Y. R. 40; E.D. Tenn. Standing Order of Oct. 6, 1978.
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federal rule 42(b) authorizes entry of such orders "to avoid
prejudice" or when "conducive to expedition and economy," it
does not envision bifurcation as a matter of course. A perceptive
article by Judge Weinstein exposes the policy foundations supporting this presumption: the results of bifurcated and unitary
trials are likely to differ.2 3 Although undoubtedly motivated by a
desire to advance local dockets, a procedural change with such
substantive overtones is inappropriate for the local rulemaking
process.2 '
A second class of local rules inconsistent with the policies
underlying the federal rules are those prescribing areas intended
to be regulated on a case-by-case basis as an exercise of judicial
discretion. Many districts limit pretrial discovery, for example,
by imposing a flat ceiling on the number of interrogatories that
may be submitted by any party without obtaining leave of the
court for good cause shown. The limit varies, depending on the
district, from twenty to fifty.25 Several of these districts have
23. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831, 834 (1961).
24. Few appellate challenges have been mounted to this sort of local rule. In at least
one area, however, rules have been struck on the ground of their inconsistency with federal procedural policy, even though not explicitly in conflict with an express provision of
a federal rule. Following a recommendation in the MANUAL FOR COmPLEX LITIGATION 1

1.41 (1982) (1-Pt. 2 J. MOORE,

MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE

31-34 (2d ed. 1984)), several

districts adopted rules that routinely required the parties in class actions to obtain leave
of court before communicating with absent class members. See, e.g., the discussion of
such rules in Williams v. United States Dist. Court, 658 F.2d 430, 434-36 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 163-65
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975). Other districts accomplished this end
through their routine entry of gag orders in pending cases. See, e.g., the order discussed
in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99-102 (1981). Because of the obstacles such
rules and orders posed to the gathering of litigation funds and evidence, plaintiffs' attorneys found ample incentive to seek quick appellate review. The silence of rule 23 on the
matter did not give appellate courts much pause; the policies underlying rule 23 are
easily ascertainable and dispositive. As the Third Circuit observed in Rodgers, "Itlhe
rules adopted must be consistent with the policy underlying Rule 23; that is a policy in
favor of having litigation in which common interests, or common questions of law or fact
prevail, disposed of where feasible in a single law suit." Rodgers, 508 F.2d at 163.
Because the local rule discouraged nonparty class members from participating in the
lawsuit, the court of appeals found the local rule "outside the power granted to the district court" by rule 83. Id. at 164.
25. E.g., D. ALASKA R. 8 (20, including all subparagraphs and sub-subparagraphs); D.
DEL. R. 4.1 (50); S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 101.1 (40); vLD. FLA. R. 3.03(a) (50); S.D. GA. R. 7.4
(25); N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 9(g) (20); S.D. ILL. R. 15 (20); S.D. IND. R. 14(c) (30); N.D., S.D.
IOWA Civ. R. 2.3.32 (30); D. KAN. R. 17(d) (30); W.D. Ky. R. 11(c) (30); W.D. LA. R. 10(a)(1)
(25); D. MD. R. 6(B) (30); D. MINN. R. 3(B) (50); N.D. Miss. R. C-12 (50 in two stages);
S.D. Miss. R. 17 (30); W.D. Mo. R. 15(K) (20, with maximum of 2 subparagraphs each);
E.D. Mo. R. 8 (20); D.N.M. R. 10(e) (50); D.S.C. Standing Order of Jan. 29, 1979 (50);
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added restrictions on the number of requests for admission that
may be filed without leave. 26 At least one district similarly limits
the number of depositions that may be taken as a matter of
course; moreover, the limit is not waivable by the parties.27 The
federal rules, however, curb abusive or unproductive overdiscovery by articulating substantive, not numerical, standards and
by calling for judicial oversight, intervention, and sanctioning
28
only on a case-by-case basis as actual circumstances warrant.
Another type of local rule exists that is so violently at odds
with some of the most fundamental policies embodied in the
federal rules that it is almost inconceivable that a district court
would adopt it. Yet at least four have done so.29 For certain clas-

ses of cases, these districts have short-circuited virtually the
entire procedural scheme created by the federal rules, substituting for it some variety of arbitration or mediation. In the Northern District of California, for example, arbitration is required for
many types of diversity actions in which the damages sought are
less than $100,000.30 In the Eastern District of Michigan, any
civil diversity case may be submitted to mediation by agreement
of the parties, motion of a party, or the court's own motion when
the relief sought is exclusively money damages."
The mediation procedures established in the Eastern District of Michigan are typical. Apparently, evidence is to be submitted in documentary form, and the local rule expressly prohibits the mediation panel from taking personal testimony from
any party.2 The rules of evidence do not apply.3 3 If the panel's
award is not rejected by any party, the court enters judgment.3 '
A party may reject the award and bring the matter to trial,35 but
the party must receive a trial verdict significantly more
favorable than the mediation award or pay actual costs, includM.D. TENN. R. 9(a)(2) (30); W.D. TENN. R. 9(g) (30); S.D. TEx. R. 10(E)(4) (30); W.D. TEx.
R. 26 (d)(1) (20); ED. VA. R. 11.1(A) (30, nonwaivable); N.D.W. VA. R. 2.06(b) (30); D.
Wvo. R. 7(f) (50).
26. E.g., D. DEL. R. 4.1(b)(4) (25); W.D. Ky. R. 11(c) (30); D.S.C. Standing Order of
Jan. 29, 1979 (20); W.D. TEx. R. 26(d)(1) (10).
27. E.D. VA. R. 11.1(B) (maximum of five depositions).
28. See infra text following note 50.
29. N.D. CAL. R. 500; E.D. MICH. R. 32; E.D. PA. R. 8.3; W.D. WASH. Civ. R. 39.1.
30. N.D. CAL. R. 500-2.
31. E.D. MICH. R. 32(a)-(b).
32. Id. at 32(i).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 32(j).
35. Id. at 32(j)(2).
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ing "an attorney fee for each day of trial."3 6
A bedrock premise of the federal rules is that cases filed in a
federal district court are to be resolved through adversarial litigation before the court, not by summary proceedings before a
mediator. A mediation scheme such as that just described is
utterly alien to civil litigation in a federal court. The local rule,
in fact, creates an entirely novel process of resolving factual and
legal issues by persons who are neither judge nor jury, and
authorizes the court to enter judgment on the mediator's decision merely because the parties have remained silent. It is
doubtful whether the procedure is saved by its "reservation" to
the parties of their right to trial, hedged as that reservation is by
penalty provisions of considerable severity.
In addition to the failure of rule 83 to proscribe local rules
that are "inconsistent" with the letter and the spirit of the federal rules, another problem has arisen over the years. Perhaps
this is because the drafters did not anticipate the zeal with
which the rulemaking power would be wielded. They therefore
made no effort to ban local rules that, although arguably "consistent" with the federal rules, are nevertheless poorly conceived,
carelessly executed, unwise, unnecessary, or downright silly.
Some local rules are unnecessary, now as in 1940, and do no
more than repeat key provisions of the federal rules.3 7 Still other
rules apparently regard the federal procedural mechanisms
merely as themes upon which they are free to create their own
variations. Discovery is a particularly fruitful area for such innovations.38 An occasional rule stands out as especially poorly con36. Id. at 32(j)(3)-(5).
37. Thus, D. MASS. R. 10(a) cautions that papers filed with it shall be served in
accordance with FED. R. Civ. P. 5 and that the form and signing of such papers shall be in
accordance with the federal rules. Similarly, N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 9(a) goes to considerable
pains to set forth general pleading requirements that closely parallel FED. R. Civ. P.
10(b). E.D. MICH. R. 20 proclaims that the court may dismiss a complaint on its own
motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thus replicating FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Most informative is W.D.N.Y. R. 21, which provides that petitions filed under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2254-2255 (governing habeas corpus petitions) must comply with the Rules Governing
§§ 2254 and 2255 Cases in the District Courts (Congress has created sets of rules for
federal habeas corpus petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255. The rules follow
the statute in the United States Code.).
38. Mimicking FED. R. Civ. P. 33, but departing substantially from its provisions,
E.D.N.Y. R. 2 establishes a quasi-interrogatory discovery device, under which a party
must provide certain personal information, under oath, within five days after being so
requested. If interrogatories have not been answered, the District of Massachusetts has
modified the enforcement mechanisms of FED. R. Civ. P. 37 with its own procedure,
under which the interrogator must apply to the clerk for a "notice of delinquency" and
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ceived. For example, a local rule of the District Court of the District of Columbia that prohibits the clerk from accepting or
filing any "complaint, amended complaint, counterclaim, cross
claim, or third party complaint [that has] appended thereto any
document that is not essential to the determination of the cause
of action." 39 Disregarding the questionable wisdom of vesting
enforcement in the clerk, the problem remains of how one determines whether a document is truly "essential" or whether it is
merely material, and of why the latter should be banished into
the outer darkness. One also may legitimately wonder why other
pleadings, such as answers and replies, are exempted from the
rigors of this rule since federal rule 10(c) permits documents and
other exhibits to be appended to those pleadings."'
Of the 3000 or so local rules now in force, only a handful,
such as the mandatory arbitration and mediation schemes, effect
radical procedural changes. Others present direct textual conflicts with federal rules. It is often difficult to assess the propriety of the large residue, for the only standards against which
they may be measured are the policies embedded in the federal
rules. Those policies may be clear and widely appreciated; more
often they are not. Of course, in theory, any local rule may be
tested against federal procedural policies, for all the federal
rules are supported by policies that can be isolated and articulated. These policies are rarely obvious, however, and to a busy
judge or attorney the task of exhuming them may not appear to
be worth the effort.
Thus, another failure of rule 83 flows from the fact that
occasions for judicially testing local rules have been and will
continue to be infrequent. Given practical realities and economic
constraints, few litigants will venture into battle over issues that
seem so arcane. To demonstrate how involved this process of
measuring local rules against federal procedural policies may
become, consider a hypothetical local rule that limits to twentymay not for 20 days thereafter move to compel answers or obtain sanctions. D. MAss. R.
15(g).
39. D.D.C. R. 1-5(d).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(c) provides: "Statements in a pleading may be adopted by
reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any
motion. A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part
thereof for all purposes." Also curious is the local rule's reference to the "cause of
action," a concept that, because of its long train of unnecessary semantic difficulties, was
intentionally omitted from the federal rules. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH.
U.L.Q. 297, 313-14 (1938).
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five the number of interrogatories a party may serve without
securing leave of the court."' Since a litigant normally could
expect to obtain leave fairly readily upon showing good cause for
additional discovery, there will seldom be any incentive to litigate whether or not the restrictive local rule is valid under rule
83. Yet, if one is prepared to make the following uneconomical
investment of effort, the resulting analysis shows that such a
rule is indeed inimical to federal procedural policies.
The essence of the hypothetical rule is that judicial discretion must be exercised before a party may submit more than the
allowed number of interrogatories. This reverses a fundamental
presumption that underlies almost all federal discovery: the
exercise of judicial discretion is necessary to limit discovery, not
to allow it.4 2 Indeed, until recent years, the parties' discovery
rights were virtually boundless, constrained only by relevance,
privilege, and work product.4 3 Advisory committees over the
years have reiterated the framers' judgment that a court's limited resources will best be allocated when routine discovery is
removed from judicial supervision, and that trial by ambush can
best be avoided when every litigant has access to all the relevant
facts." The federal rules radically restructured pretrial processes
that isolate the legal and factual issues actually in controversy.
Under the codes, this task was largely fulfilled by rigorous
pleading rules. The federal rules substituted a much more
relaxed "notice pleading" standard and shifted to the discovery
phase much of the burden of issue production. Whether this
shift was wise is not now the question; it was made, and its
objectives unquestionably are undercut by a local rule that,
without considering the actual needs of a particular case, routinely limits the parties' ability to add flesh to skeletal
41. Of course, it is not really necessary to hypothesize such a rule, since at least two
local rules actually so provide. S.D. GA. R. 7.4; W.D. LA. R. l(a)(1). See supra note 25 for
the numerical limits imposed by other districts.
42. Because of the potential for unnecessary invasions of personal privacy, FED. R.
Civ. P. 35 creates an exception for requests for physical and mental examinations, for
which leave of court is still required.
43. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)-(b) (1976). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)-(b), 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp.
1984). When the discovery rules were rearranged in 1970, the Advisory Committee on
Rules noted that a provision that the frequency of use of discovery methods was not
limited confirmed existing law. See Advisory Committee Notes on the 1970 Amendments, Rule 26, Subdivision (a), 48 F.R.D. 487, 498 (1970).
44. E.g., Advisory Committee Notes on the 1970 Amendments, Rule 34, 48 F.R.D.
487, 526 (1970). See Advisory Committee Notes on the 1983 Amendments, Rule 26, 97
F.R.D. 165, 216 (1983). See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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pleadings.
The history of rules 26 and 33 fully supports this policy
analysis. As a result of discontent with federal discovery practice, there have been several recent efforts to impose numerical
quotas on the various discovery devices, especially interrogatories." These efforts came to a head in 1978 and 1979. In a preliminary draft of proposed amendments to the federal rules, the
Advisory Committee noted that except when a protective order
has been entered, rule 26(a) expressly provides that the frequency of use of the discovery methods is not limited." Believing that the district courts might be "deterred" by this language
from adopting local rules restricting discovery, the committee
initially recommended amending rule 33 to authorize local rules
limiting the number of interrogatories.4 7 The committee subsequently changed its mind and abandoned this proposal; the district courts never were authorized to impose such limitations by
local rule."' Instead, subsection (f) was added to federal rule 26
in 1980 to grant district courts the power to hold discovery conferences at which a court could enter discovery plans tailored to
the needs of each case.
Even more to the point, rule 26(b) was amended in 1983 to
permit the erection of discovery limits under certain circumstances-for example, when discovery was cumulative, repetitive, or imposed undue burden. 9 The new rule makes clear that
these factors must be weighed on a case-by-case basis and limitations imposed only when actually warranted." The rule leaves
untouched the antecedent presumption that primary responsibility for conducting discovery rests with the litigants, a pre45. See discussion in C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 81, at 540 n.8 (4th ed. 1983).
46. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (1978). See Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 33, Subdivision (a),
77 F.R.D. 613, 648-49 (1978).
47. Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Rule 33, Subdivision (a), 77 F.R.D. 613,
648-49 (1978).
48. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 F.R.D. 323 (1979).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1984).
50. Id. See Advisory Committee Notes on the 1983 Amendments, Rule 26, Subdivision (b), 97 F.R.D. 216, 218 (1983) ("In an appropriate case the court could restrict the
number of depositions, interrogatories, or the scope of a production request. But the
court must be careful not to deprive a party of discovery that is reasonably necessary to
afford a fair opportunity to develop and prepare the case.").
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sumption turned on its head by the hypothetical local rule under
consideration.
If, as here, a local rule reverses a fundamental presumption
in the federal rules, it should be open to a successful challenge.
The failure of the challenge indicates the inability of rule 83 to
limit the local rulemaking power. The task is to ascertain the
appropriate limits on local rulemaking power and to so articulate them that the courts will be given meaningful and effective
guidance. A straightforward cost/benefit analysis is the simplest
means of discovering these limits.
The one extreme-that rule 83 impose no limit on local
rulemaking-is completely untenable, for the federal rules then
would have only such effect as each district chose to give them.
Chaos even worse than that prevailing under the old Conformity
Act"' soon would prevail. At the other extreme, amending the
rule to withdraw all rulemaking power from the district courts is
measurably more attractive than unlimited rulemaking authority, but also has unacceptable costs. Although the federal rules
establish a coherent, workable, and reasonably complete procedural system to resolve civil litigation, some aspects of case management almost certainly are governed better by local regulations than by national ones.
What are the benefits of vesting rulemaking power in the
district courts? First, one qualified advantage of local rulemaking is the flexibility it may give in accommodating local conditions and needs. Rules of nationwide application can address
only those problems that are common to all districts. Trial dockets, for example, are largely a product of local conditions and
pressures, and their setting and maintenance are most effectively accomplished by local judges. By formalizing practices
customarily followed by district judges and by communicating
those practices to attorneys,5" local rules add predictability to
procedural decision-making, and help speed the orderly and efficient resolution of litigation. Unfortunately, it is easy to give too
much weight to "local conditions" as a rationale for local rules.
Many national problems have local manifestations, but such
local symptoms do not always warrant local cures.
51. The Conformity Act required that in civil actions the federal district conform
"as near as may be" to the procedure of the state in which it sat. Act of June 1, 1872, ch.
255, 17 Stat. 197.
52. See, e.g., M.D. FLA. R. 5.03(b) (customs of the court regarding courtroom
decorum).
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Second, local rulemaking also may achieve efficiencies by
rendering routine certain judicial tasks that otherwise would be
decided on a case-by-case basis. The federal rules commit many
procedural questions to the discretion of the trial judge. At least
insofar as those questions that arise frequently in a given court
are concerned, it may make sense to resolve them by a uniform
rule capable of relatively mechanical application rather than
requiring the judge to "re-invent the wheel" each time. Some
districts, for example, have fixed by rule a particular dollar
amount for the removal bond required by statute,5 3 thus obviating the need to re-examine the matter in every case removed
from state courts. There is a risk, however, that translating discretionary powers into formal rules may generate more inefficiencies than it avoids. This is particularly true in discovery,
during which legitimate needs are likely to vary dramatically
from case to case. Handling such matters by relatively inflexible
rules may therefore impede rather than promote the efficient
administration of justice.
Even though not unqualified, such benefits as these are valuable. By their nature, however, the benefits extend only to
those districts that affirmatively seek them. But local rules have
a third characteristic with the potential to benefit the entire federal judicial system. This comes from their capability of serving
as models for reform, in which innovative procedural approaches
may be tested on a limited scale in order to evaluate their suitability for system-wide adoption. The preliminary draft of the
amendment to rule 83 would have permitted experimental
54
rulemaking, but that provision unfortunately was dropped. If
local rules are to be used as models for reform,55 it will be at the
cost either of producing only the most trivial modifications or
53. E.g., D. MASS. R. 25(1) ($250); S.D. Miss. R. 4 ($500). The party seeking to
remove a case from state to federal court must post a bond under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d)
(1982).
54. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Aug. 1983, 98 F.R.D. 337, 370-73 (1983).
55. Federal rules committees have looked to the experience of state courts in assessing proposed reforms, although in some respects the business of state courts is sufficiently different from that of their federal counterparts so that drawing meaningful federal lessons from state practices may be difficult. This is not to say that very useful
information cannot be drawn from state experience. Based in part on Wisconsin's
favorable experience with a state rule authorizing scheduling and planning conferences,
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) was added in 1983 to encourage such conferences in the federal
courts. See Advisory Committee Notes on the 1983 Amendments, Rule 16(b), 97 F.R.D.
165, 207-09 (1983).
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else of simply pretending that rule 83, with its demand that local
rules be "consistent" with the federal rules, does not exist. Otherwise, federal procedural progress will continue to be accomplished by quantum jumps from proposal to system-wide
adoption.
Despite the advantages associated with local rulemaking,
there are undoubted costs as well. Clients pay more when attorneys from outside a district find it necessary to retain local
counsel familiar with a court's procedural idiosyncrasies. If an
additional layer of local lawyers is not added to the case, local
rules still generate additional costs through attorneys' efforts to
familiarize themselves with the requirements. There is an
attendant increased risk of error in understanding and applying
the local rules, possibly leading to substantive injustice.
Even when no foreign counsel are involved, unnecessary,
ambiguous, or counter-productive unsound local rules inevitably
will produce considerable inefficiencies. Far too many local rules
appear to be ad hoc efforts to cure specific narrow problems,
rather than concrete applications of more general principles.
Thus, if a court perceives interrogatories to be frequently overemployed or abused, it is likely to draft a rule restricting their
routine use. If its dockets are clogged, it may institute some
alternative form of dispute resolution such as mandatory arbitration. Even when rules are borne of understandable frustration
at finding no curative measures taken at the national level, their
perspective is usually too narrow. The most extreme examples
discussed in this essay are not representative of local rules as a
whole, but problem rules do occur with sufficient frequency to
warrant re-examination of the process that spawns them.
Of course, as a product of human minds, the federal rules
may safely be assumed to be flawed in ways that generate procedural inefficiencies that in turn contribute to the current
crowded state of federal trial dockets. Nevertheless, although
the web woven may not be quite seamless, its parts are strongly
interdependent,5 6 and poorly drawn local rules merely aggravate
56. As Judge Clark put it, "a greater degree of legal sophistication is usually needed
than in the substantive field to appreciate the subtle nuances of procedural causes and
effects and their interrelation, yet the subject is often approached with a blitheness,
indeed a naivet6, on the whole appalling." Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and
Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 496 (1950). Put more
bluntly, most judges have their hands full in keeping up with their dockets. They cannot
be expected to have the time, the inclination, or the expertise necessary for improving
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this problem. Conversely, even the best-formulated local rules
cannot solve the problem since by nature their effect is purely
local. Worse, they can mask the gravity of the problems and
divert attention from the need to address them nationally. Judging from the large number of districts that have issued rules regulating prisoner condition-of-confinement suits,5 7 for example,
there appears to be a consensus that such suits pose a threat to
the integrity of federal dockets. These palliative measures will
not make the problem disappear; they merely confuse it and
shift the field of battle from the national level, where it should
be, to the hinterlands.
CONCLUSION

District courts have promulgated approximately 3000 local
rules, and more will surely follow, threatening both the integrity
and the uniformity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To
be sure, ameliorative reforms have been undertaken, but the
reformers have not been asking the appropriate questions. Any
reformulation of rule 83 should strive to create procedural consistency, while maintaining flexibility. The following specific
issues should be addressed:
First. The necessity for local rules must be confirmed, but
their scope tightly circumscribed.
Second. The limits on local rulemaking should be bright,
clear, and explicit. A fluid standard of ambiguous meaning, such
as the current "consistency" test, will not stay local efforts to
improve upon the federal rules. Rule 83, moreover, must discourage local rules that are arguably consistent with the federal
rules but regulate matters inappropriate for local control.
upon the federal rules. Indeed, it is a testament to their abilities and energies that local
rules have not produced more problems than they have.
57. E.g., S.D. ALA. R. 21; S.D. FLA. GEN. R. 18(A); N.D. ILL. GEN. R. 47; S.D. ILL. R. 10;
N.D. IND. R. 6A; D. KAN. R. 33; W.D. Ky. R. 29; D. MD. R. 37A; E.D. MICH. R. 16(d); W.D.
MICH. R. 40; N.D. Miss. R. M-4.2; D.N.M. R. 26; W.D.N.Y. R. 7(A); M.D.N.C. R. 18;
E.D.N.C. GEN. R. 11.00; S.D. Ohio Standing Order of Sept. 1, 1981; E.D. OKLA. R. 5; W.D.
PA. R. 38; D.P.R. R. 28; N.D. TEx. R. 3.2(b); D. UTAH R. 19(b); W.D. WASH. Civ. R. 103.
The research arm of the federal courts has promoted the adoption of highly questionable
local rules to cope with the perceived flood. PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITTEE, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER,

RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES

FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS

(1980). The Center's recommendations are surveyed, and
many criticized, in Note, State Prisoners,Federal Rules, and Playing by the Rules: An
Analysis of the Aldisert Committee's Recommended Proceduresfor Handling Prisoner
Civil Rights Cases, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 131 (1981).
CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
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Third. The normal appellate process has proved inadequate
to keep local rules within proper bounds. The impact of the
rules on individual litigants is usually too glancing to warrant
appeal, and so they remain unchallenged. The alternative proposed in amended rule 83 is circuit judicial council abrogation of
local rules. This approach is not satisfactory." The current reliance upon normal appellate processes to test questionable local
rules at least has the virtue of only rarely giving explicit appellate approval to local rules. Under the proposed veto approach, a
judicial council's failure to act on a local rule may give it quick
respectability, thus encouraging other districts within the circuit
to adopt the rule. Replacing district-to-district inconsistencies
with circuit-to-circuit inconsistencies may be an improvement,
but not much of one. A preferable alternative is to require
approval by the Judicial Conference of the United States, perhaps by delegating that function to its Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure or to its Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules. Those organs, charged as they are with maintaining and improving the federal rules,5s have the expertise and
perspective essential to an informed evaluation of proposed local
rules.
Fourth. Local rules should be permitted when they are
expressly required or permitted to be made by statute or federal
rule, 0 and when regulation is accomplished better at the local
than at the national level. The former need not now detain us,
since the principal difficulty with local rules lies in line-drawing
when Congress has not spoken. Precise placement of those lines
is difficult. It is not helpful to look for distinctions between
"local problems" and "national problems," for in a broad sense
all procedural problems are local. That is the only place they
58. Interestingly, circuit court approval prior to adoption of local rules was considered by the framers of rule 83, but rejected. A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 2, at 357
(statement of G. Donworth).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 620 (1984). A thorough study of the process and proposals for change

is W.

BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES

(1981).

60. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 137 (1984) (division of business in multi-judge districts); 28
U.S.C. § 139 (1984) (times and places for regular sessions of court); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4)
(1984) (magistrates' discharge of duties); 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1984) (appearances); 28
U.S.C. § 1863 (1984) (plans for random selection of jurors); 28 U.S.C. § 1914(c) (1984)
(advance payment of fees); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (cases exempted from mandatory scheduling conferences); FED. R. Civ. P. 40 (trial calendars); FED. R. Civ. P. 66 (receiverships);
FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a)-(b), 74(d), 75(c), (e) (proceedings before magistrates); FED. R. Civ. P.
77(c) (extended hours for clerk's office); FED. R. Civ. P. 78 (motion days; submission and
determination of motions without oral hearing).
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can manifest themselves. Subject matter jurisdiction is just as
much a local problem as is docket control, yet the former should
be regulated nationally and the latter locally. The key lies
instead in the causes of a procedural problem. If they are necessarily or largely idiosyncratic to each district, then the cure will
be also. A uniform rule will only hinder, since it can consider
only those causes that are common to all districts. Where commonality of causation does exist, however, uniform rules are the
optimum solution. Not only are economies of scale achieved by
having the problem addressed by one body instead of by ninetyfive, but that one body likely will generate better rules since it
can acquire a level of expertise and sophistication unattainable
elsewhere. 6 1
Fifth. Consistent with the need for bright-line guidance, a
revised rule 83 should explicitly delineate those areas in which
local rulemaking is appropriate, applying the general criteria
discussed above.2
Sixth. Rule 83 should exploit the potential use of local rules
as demonstration models to test proposed modifications of the
federal rules. Prior approval of the Judicial Conference ought to
be required and temporarily limited so that the districts
involved do not become permanent pockets of procedural
nonuniformity. Most important, the experiments must be scientifically designed to yield objective evidence by which their success or failure can be measured, not results that are merely
impressionistic. This almost certainly would require the infusion
of funds and personnel from outside the district.
Without further modification, rule 83 will almost certainly
fail to stem the proliferation of local rules that are inconsistent
with the policies of the federal rules. When local rulemaking
rests on a more solid foundation, district courts will have flexi61. Discovery can illustrate the distinction between local causes and local symptoms. Abuse of discovery is probably a greater problem in some districts than in others.
So also are the consequent demands upon a judge's limited time. Yet those demands,
indeed even the antecedent local overdiscovery, are merely symptoms of a national problem. That more attorneys in district A submit excessive interrogatories than do counsel
in district B does not mean that the causes of interrogatory abuse are idiosyncratic to
district A. It means only that the federal rules governing interrogatory practice are too
loosely drawn to prevent abuse wherever it may arise.
62. For example: (a) administrative matters concerning the court's own operation;
(b) admission and discipline of attorneys; (c) hearings and arguments on motions; (d)
bonds, undertakings, and fees; (e) pre-trial conferences; (f) trial calendars; (g) proceedings before magistrates; (h) receiverships; (i) size of juries; and (k) taxation of costs and
awards of fees and expenses.
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bility to regulate matters that are truly local, but local rules that
impede the efficient federal administration of justice by straying
into areas more appropriately left to nationwide rulemaking will
be precluded.

